Representation of Effective Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium

Representation of Effective Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium
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ISBN-10 : OCLC:535422587
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Book Synopsis Representation of Effective Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium by : Hans Keiding

Download or read book Representation of Effective Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium written by Hans Keiding and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:


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